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Abstract
The rising trends both in drug addiction and crime rates are of major
public concern in Germany. Surprisingly, the economic theory of crime
seems to ignore the drugs–crime nexus, whereas the criminological lit-
erature considers illicit drug use a main reason of criminal activities.
This paper provides an econometric assessment of the drugs–crime
channel within a Becker–Ehrlich model of crime supply. Estimation
with panel data from the German states allows us to take into account
further factors that might influence both drug abuse and crime. The
results indicate that drug offences have a significant impact, in particu-
lar on property crimes. We attribute this to a strong economic–related
channel of drug abuse on crime.
∗We are indebted to two referees for valuable comments on a preliminary version of
this paper. Nevertheless, we take full responsibility for any remaining shortcomings.
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1 Introduction
The rising trends both in drug addiction and crime rates are of major public
concern in Germany. Public concern about narcotics and crime covers both
moral and economic aspects. The analysis mainly concentrates on the costs of
drug addiction and related crimes which include expenditures of the public
health system for drug addicts, negative productivity effects of drug use,
tax evasion of black market activities, costs of prosecution among others.
Furthermore, drug abuse may contribute to an increase in overall crime rates.
In fact, the evidence of a strong connection between illicid drug use and a
wide range of criminal activities seems to be overwhelming. For instance,
Beck et al. (1993) report that 49% of U.S. State Prison Inmates commit-
ted their offence under the influence of drugs or alcohol, and 17% indicated
committing their offence to get money to buy drugs. Harrison and Gfroerer
(1992) found that 26.1% of persons booked for any violent crime, and 24.7% of
persons booked for any property crime used alcohol, cannabis and cocaine. A
recent research study of the British Home Office analysed the results of urine
tests carried out on 839 people arrested in five areas of England (London,
Cambridge, Manchester, Nottingham and Sunderland). The outcome was
that nearly two thirds tested positive for at least one illegal drug. Moreover,
the Home Office estimates that one third of acquisitive crime is drug–related
(see NACRO, 1999). German official crime statistics reveal that among the
total number of offences cleared by the police 8.2% were under the influence
of hard1 illegal drugs and 8.7% were under the influence of alcohol in 2003
(Bundeskriminalamt, 2004). For robbery, the shares were 16.7% and 14.6%,
for rape, the shares were 4.6% and 27.6%, and for homicides 7.4% and 25.2%,
respectively.
Following Goldstein (1985) and Goldstein, Brownstein and Ryan (1992),
criminologists provide three different explanations of drug–related crime (see
also Corman and Mocan, 2000). First, system–related crimes include those
that are related to the system of drug production and drug trafficking, in
particular concomitant crimes such as corruption, intimidation, extortion
and crimes of violence. Competition for drug markets and customers cause
1This refers mostly to heroine and cocain. The quoted source of German crime statis-
tics (Bundeskriminalamt, 2004, Table 12, Appendix) does not include abuse of cannabis
products.
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disputes and rip–offs among individuals involved in the illegal drug–market,
murders as means of enforcing systemic codes, killing of informants, injury or
death resulting from disputes over drug possession, territory, etc. (Goldstein,
Brownstein and Ryan, 1992). On the one hand, these crimes originate from
interdicting the production and traffic of drugs and on the other hand from
the high rents, which can be obtained by violating the law. Concomitant
crimes raise market entry barriers for potential concurrent suppliers in order
to protect monopolistic rents from drug traffic.
Second, economic–related crimes are committed as a result of the drug users’
compulsion to obtain drugs (Goldstein, Brownstein and Ryan, 1992). Seen
from an economist’s viewpoint, economic–related crimes are more related to
the demand side of the illegal drug market, whereas systemic effects can be
attributed to the supply side. The high costs of narcotics2 combined with
a possibly low price elasticity resulting from addiction require high income.
If the drug addicts can afford their consumption out of current income or
wealth, an increase of criminal offences is not to be expected from the de-
mand side. However, a large fraction of drug addicts are younger people
without finished education and other groups of the population with low in-
come from legal activities. These addicts might finance their consumption
through prostitution or illegal activities like theft and robbery.
Finally, victim/offender use–related crimes include those that are consequen-
tial to the consumption of drugs by the victim or offender, since the ingestion
of a drug may cause irrational or violent behaviour. This effect of drug abuse
is also called the pharmacological effect.
The major part of the empirical evidence in the literature on drug–related
crime is based on correlative evidence between drug addiction or drug offences
and criminal activity. However, third factors might be responsible for both
drug consuming and crime, e.g. poverty and unemployment may be claimed
to be the true underlying causes of both use of narcotics and acquisitive
crime. In a rare exception to the criminological literature, Otero–Lopez et
al. (1994) have found support of this view. Based on a survey of over two
thousand male students between 14 and 18 years of age, the authors claimed
2Despite a falling trend in prices since the mid eighties due to increased supply, the price
per gram of cocaine or heroine is still of the order of magnitude of e 50 (Landeskriminalamt
Baden–Wu¨rttemberg 2001, p. 55).
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support for the notion that peer, family, and individual factors were more
predictive of both risk behaviours than either risk behaviour was on the other.
Economists who follow the general approach of “The Economics of Crime”
(Becker 1968, Ehrlich 1973) for testing the deterrence hypothesis are used
to control for “third factors”. Changing economic incentives can influence
crimes as was shown in numerous articles. Recent important examples focus
on the impact of unemployment (Raphael and Winter–Ebmer 2001) or show
that the introduction of minimum wages has led to a fall in crime rates in
the U.K. (Hansen and Machin 2001). However, economists usually ignore the
importance of illicit drug use in economic crime studies. Corman and Mo-
can (2000) and Kuziemko and Levitt (2001) provide remarkable exceptions.
Based on monthly time series from New York City Corman and Mocan (2000)
compare the relative magnitudes of the effects of local law enforcement activ-
ities on crime with the magnitude of variations in drug use on crime. They
find that law enforcement effects on crime are stronger and more significant
than drug usage, which only has a small effect on property crimes. Kuziemko
and Levitt (2001) analyse the effect of imprisoning drug offenders and find
that the reduction in violent and property crime associated with adding one
additional drug prisoner was almost as great as the reduction in crime when
a violent or property offender was sentenced to prison.
The purpose of this study is to provide an econometric assessment of the
economics–of–crime model with a special focus on the impact of illicit drugs
on crime. Unlike Corman and Mocan (2000), who were restricted to consider
deterrence, poverty and drug usage as explanatory variables in their high–
frequency data set coming from a big metropolis, we take a broader view
to the crime problem, inspired by recent social and economic problems like
unemployment, migration, inequality, and demographic changes in Europe.
The focus of our contribution has changed from the traditional testing of the
deterrence hypothesis to the analysis of socio–economic, drug–driven and
demographic factors.
Evidence from a panel of the German Laender (the German “states”) allows
us to exploit the very heterogeneous experiences in densely populated urban
areas such as Bremen and Hamburg (which are also states, so–called “Stadt-
staaten”, i.e. “city–states”) and sparsely populated areas such as Lower Sax-
ony. Some considerable heterogeneity is also given due to the German federal
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system, according to which state governments are responsible for their police
and the fight against crime within the borders of the corresponding Laen-
der. Given the short time span of data for East Germany, our econometric
analysis is restricted to West Germany.
The theoretical modelling of dynamic adjustment through partial adjustment
of expected deterrence combined with a statistical model of measurement
error in crime rates results in a dynamic specification of our econometric
model. In addition, the model might include regional and time specific ef-
fects resulting from possible measurement errors due to different shares of
underreporting in crime rates and other sources of unobserved heterogeneity.
Our results indicate that ignoring the effect of drug use in empirical models of
the economics of crime would lead to an omitted variable bias. Drug offences
have a relatively strong effect on property crimes and and on rape although
conditional estimates controlling for factors known from the economics of
crime literature turn out to be much smaller than correlative evidence would
suggest. The deterrence hypothesis of the economics of crime model is con-
firmed for property crimes, whereas no convincing evidence has been found
for violent crime.
The remainder of this article is organised as follows. Section 2 describes
general tendencies of drug abuse and crime rates and provides stylized facts
on the direct crime–drugs nexus and potential third factors. The economet-
ric modelling framework, the choice of relevant variables and the available
data are introduced in section 3. The estimation results are summarized in
section 4. They allow for conclusions on the extent to which illegal drug
use contributes to the development of overall crime rates. In section 5, we
present results of our sensitivity analysis of the estimates. The findings are
linked to the public issue of drug related crimes in section 6.
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2 Crime, drug offences and potential third
factors of crime
2.1 General tendencies
Due to the illegal nature of drug abuse and drug related crimes, it is difficult
to obtain reliable data on the extent of these phenomena. Corman and Mocan
(2000) use the number of deaths which are due to drug poisoning as a proxy
for drug use. Figure 1 shows these numbers for Germany3 in the lower panel,
while the upper panel depicts the number of first time users of drugs, which
became noticed by the police.4
The number of deaths due to drug use are not a very close proxy for the
development of drug use for several reasons. First, there exists a time lag
between drug use and death caused by drug abuse, since a large fraction
of these deaths is caused by physical decay due to persisting drug abuse.5
Second, the number of deaths is influenced by changing concentration of
narcotics within the drugs supplied (Bundeskriminalamt 2000). Furthermore,
drug–addicted may move from rural areas to cities during their “drug career”.
Then, the use of death rates may overstate drug abuse in the German city
states compared to the other states. Consequently, estimates based on a
panel of German states might be biased using this proxy. Using the number
of first time users is not a satisfying proxy either. First, the numbers depend
on the awareness of the police officers who get into contact with the drug
user. Thus, these numbers might be biased downward for areas where drug
abuse is less common. Second, these numbers measure flows into the pool of
drug users. Since no estimates of the outflow are available, it seems difficult
3The data are for West Germany until 1990, for West Germany and Berlin in 1991 and
for Germany since 1992.
4By definition of the German Federal Criminal Police Office, first time users of drugs
are persons coming in contact to police or customs officers for the first time in relation
to the use of illicit drugs. This definition does not imply that all first time users are or
become drug addicts.
5For example, no relevant number of deaths which are due to drug poisoning were yet
reported for East Germany in 1999. In contrast, the number of reported first time drug
users, increased by 23.4% in East Germany from 1998 to 1999, while a slight decrease of
1.8% in West Germany for the same time period corresponds to an increase in the number
of deaths by 8.2%.
6
Figure 1: First time users and deaths due to drug posisoning
Source: Bundeskriminalamt (1999, 2000, 2001); own calculations.
to obtain a proxy of the stock of drug addicts which is more relevant for our
analysis of the drug–crime nexus.
Given the limits of these proxies for drug abuse, the numbers on direct drug
offences reported by the German Federal Criminal Police Office (Bundeskrim-
inalamt) appear to be a more sensible proxy for the overall development of
drug abuse. These numbers include reported cases of illegal drug trafficking,
possession and consumption of drugs, but do not include procuring crimes
like theft from pharmacies. While this measure shares the drawback to de-
pend on the effort of the police spent on persecuting these crimes,6 it appears
to be the most suitable proxy for monitoring the impact of drug abuse on
overall crime rates.
6We will control for this effect in the econometric specification (see Section 3).
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The relevance of an analysis of drug abuse and its impact on overall crime
rates is substantiated by the increase of drug abuse as measured by these
numbers from the German Federal Criminal Office. Figure 2 and Table 1
show the development of overall crime rates and offences against drug related
laws.
Figure 2: Crime rates and drug offences (cases per 100 000 inhabitants)
Crime rates
Drug offences
Source: Bundeskriminalamt (1999, 2000, 2001); own calculations.
The upper panel of Figure 2 plots the development of overall crime rates in
West and East Germany. While West German data exhibit no clear ten-
dency during the 1990s, East German crime rates start at a higher level
in 1993 and slowly adjust downwards. The development of drug offences
shown in the lower panel shows a rising trend for West Germany and a fast
adjustment of East German rates. From the early seventies to the end of
the nineties, the numbers increase from less than 50 to almost 300 cases per
100 000 inhabitants for West Germany. However, the increase is not uniform.
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In recessionary periods like the early eighties and again in 1992/93, the num-
bers remain almost constant. In East Germany after unification almost no
offences against drug related laws are reported. Reliable numbers are avail-
able only from 1993 on. They show a tremendous increase over the seven
year period to 2000, when East German figures amounted already to more
than 50% of West German figures.
Like all crime related data, these numbers have to be interpreted with some
care since an increase might result from a real increase in offences, a stiffening
of relevant laws, or an increase of the share of known cases among all cases.
However, a stiffening of relevant laws cannot be observed during the 1990s.
Thus, although underreporting might have been more pronounced in East
Germany immediately after unification, the sharp increase in cases from 1993
to 2000 indicates that the overall trend might be mainly determined by an
increase in offences.
In Table 1, a disaggregation is undertaken with regard to the characteristics
of the federal states. The first two entries show that the rate of offences is
much higher in the city states, which might correspond to a supply side effect
on the one side and higher income opportunities on the other. The numbers
for the federal states in West Germany with highest and lowest case numbers
exhibit some dispersion, which, at least partially, might be attributed to the
higher share of urban population in Nordrhein–Westfalen as compared to the
rather rural state Schleswig–Holstein. Finally, the last two entries show the
enormous increase in cases for the East German federal states with highest
(Brandenburg) and lowest (Sachsen) case numbers in 1993.
The statistics of the German Federal Criminal Police Office also provides
some further information on the link between (illegal) drug use and other
crime categories. Unfortunately, these data are not very comprehensive and
do not allow for a causal interpretation. Nevertheless, they may provide
some further stylized facts. For example, Bundeskriminalamt (2004), p. 131,
indicates that in 2003 16% of robbery cases, which have been solved, were
committed by drug addicts. However, a large share of unsolved cases makes it
difficult to draw inferences from these findings. Comparable figures for crimes
of violence are not provided for drug addicts, but Bundeskriminalamt (2004),
p. 132, reports that 62% of violent bill dodging and 41% of solved cases of
manslaughter were committed under influence of alcohol. Consequently, at
9
Table 1: Drug offences (cases per 100 000 inhabitants)
federal state 1993 2003 Change
Federal state corresponding to cities
Hamburg 437 729 66.8%
Bremen 450 567 26.0%
Other federal states, West Germany
Max.: Nordrhein–Westf. 213 328 54.0%
Min.: Schleswig–Holstein 85 288 238.8%
Other federal states, East Germany
Max.: Brandenburg 11 222 1918.2%
Min.: Sachsen 6 221 3583.3%
Source: Bundeskriminalamt (1994, 2004); own calculations.
least the pharmacological effect of drug abuse might have an even stronger
impact on overall crime rates, in particular for crimes of violence, when legal
drugs like alcohol are also taken into consideration.7
2.2 General crime trends and the direct crime–drugs
nexus
Obviously, the reported figures on drug offences do not cover all crimes, which
might be related to drug–addiction and the market for illegal drugs. Neither
do they include direct procurement crimes such as theft from pharmacies8 nor
further economic or system–related crimes. In order to obtain a first hint on
a potential direct crime–drugs nexus, Figure 3 plots the development of drug
offences in the upper panel against the developments of crimes of violence
and property crimes in the lower panel. All data are for West Germany and
indexed to the base year 1975.
7For example, Edberg (2004) reports a highly significant effect of alcohol consumption
on violent crime.
8Surprisingly, the statistics indicate, that only about 60% of these directly drug re-
lated crimes are committed by drug–addicted. In Bundeskriminalamt (1998), p. 68, this
observation is explained by a non complete assessment of drug–addiction among criminals.
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Figure 3: Trends in crime rates (West Germany)
Source: Bundeskriminalamt (1999, 2000, 2001); own calculations.
The crime rates of all considered crime categories exhibit a positive trend.
However, the trend in drug offences is much more pronounced than in the
other crime categories. The correlation between drug offences and the other
two crime categories is substantial. In fact, the correlation with crimes of
violence amounts to 0.80, and the correlation with property crimes to 0.61.9
However, given that the trends in all crime categories might be determined
by further (common) factors, it is not appropriate to draw far reaching causal
conclusion from these findings. In particular, it is not adequate to deduce a
stronger effect on system–related crimes, which are more likely to be crimes of
violence, relative to the effect on economic–related crimes, which fall into the
category of property crimes. An assessment of the impact of drug offences on
9The highest correlation of drug offences with a more disaggregated set of crime cate-
gories is found with theft. It amounts to 0.93.
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overall crime rates requires a comprehensive model which controls for third
factors.
To a certain extent, higher crime rates might be the result of a more intensive
work of the police itself. This surprising conclusion might be drawn from
Figure 4, which shows growth rates of expenditures on police per capita and
(total) crime rates in Western Germany. The high positive correlation of 0.47
indicates that a better financial endowment enables the police to light up the
share of “dark figures” of official crime statistics, since more criminal acts can
be processed and registered.10 Since the share of unreported crimes sheds
doubts on the official crime statistic as a basis upon researchers wish to make
inferences, we need to consider this helpful information in our econometric
model (see Section 3).
2.3 Potential third factors
Third factors, which might influence the crime–drugs nexus, are all those,
which determine drug consumption, overall crime rates or both. Conse-
quently, all the socio–economic variables, found to be important in the econo-
metric modelling of crime rates, have to be considered, e.g. measures of in-
come and income distribution (GDP, unemployment, share of young men), a
distinction between rural areas and cities, or political factors such as ruling
party or coalition. Since these factors might also be linked to drug consump-
tion, Table 2 shows some correlations between the number of drug offences
per inhabitant and these factors.
Again, the bivariate correlations do not allow for a causal interpretation. For
example, the positive correlation between a conservative government and the
number of drug offences at the federal level might be due solely to the fact
that a conservative government was in place for the whole period 1981 – 1997,
i.e. during the period with highest increase in the number of drug offences.
Nevertheless, the results indicate the potential importance of neglecting third
factors, which exhibit some statistical correlation both with drug offences and
10As can be seen from the calculation of cross–correlation coefficients, police expendi-
tures are rather leading than lagging with respect to crime rates: The coefficient is 0.46
if it is estimated using a one–year lag of crime, and it is −0.10 if crime would lead by one
year.
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Figure 4: Growth rates of police expenditures and crime rates
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calculations.
overall crime rates.
Our econometric model will include two–way fixed effects, i.e. for the German
Laender and each year in order to control for further unobserved factors, e.g.
the development of prices on the market for illegal drugs.11
3 Econometric specification and data
The econometric model to test for the influence of drug offences on other
crime rates is embedded in the standard theoretical framework of “The Eco-
11Unfortunately, the price data are not yet available on a Laender base.
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Table 2: Drug offences and third factors
Correlation Cross section of Time series
between West German for West Germany
drug offences and Laender in 1990 1975–1997
Unemployment
rate 0.71 0.61
Share of
young men -0.50 -0.76
GDP (1991 = 100)
per capita 0.83 0.93
City states 0.89 —
Ruling party
is conservative -0.47 0.68
Source: Bundeskriminalamt (1994, 2000); own calculations.
nomics of Crime” provided in Becker’s (1968) seminal article. Becker’s theory
of deterrence is an application of the general theory of rational behaviour un-
der uncertainty. Optimising individuals engage in criminal activities when
expected payoffs of the criminal activity exceed the costs of criminal activity,
mainly given by the probability and severity of sanctions. Ehrlich (1973)
extended Becker’s model by considering a time allocation model. Since time
can be allocated to legal and illegal activities, besides deterrence “third”
variables of legal and illegal income opportunities start to play a central role
in empirical tests of the Becker–Ehrlich model, approximated by abilities,
family income, human capital, and other socio–economic variables.
These considerations have led to the basic Becker–Ehrlich specification of the
so-called “supply of offences” (see Grogger 1991, Ehrlich 1996, Levitt 1996,
Corman and Mocan 2000, Edberg 2004, and Entorf and Spengler 2000, for
recent applications). From this theoretical background, we derive the base
model in logarithmic notation as
lnOit = β lnP
e
it + γ
′Xit , (1)
where Oit is the crime rate in region i and period t (number of offences per
100,000 inhabitants), P eit is the expected probability of detection and Xit
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represent other explanatory variables like income opportunities, demograph-
ics and illicit drug use. Given that laws applying to offenders are identical
in all German states and did not change substantially during the sample
period, the expected probability of detection is an adequate measure of de-
terrence. The significance of deterrence seems to be well documented for
the US, where recent contributions by Corman and Mocan (2000) and in
particular by Levitt (1996, 1997, 1998) confirm early results of, for instance,
Ehrlich (1973). In our German case study, deterrence is measured by the
expected percentage of (registered) offences cleared by the police. Unfortu-
nately, such a variable might cause some problems because the denominator
of this variable (the number of crimes) is the dependent variable and some re-
verse causation effect might be present. However, in the dynamic model (3)
used for our empirical analysis this ratio bias is avoided since only lagged
values of the deterrence variable have to be included (see Levitt, 1998).
The expectations about the probability of detection are modelled in a partial
adjustment framework, which assumes that expectations are persistent and
partially adjusted to expectation errors, i.e.
lnP eit = lnP
e
i,t−1 + λ
(
lnPi,t−1 − lnP ei,t−1
)
, (2)
where λ measures the speed of adjustment. It ranges between 0 (no adjust-
ment of expectations to observed detection rates at all) and 1 (full adjustment
of expected detection rates).
Solving this partial adjustment model and inserting the solution into the base
model of economics of crime (1), the following dynamic model results, where
the restrictions imposed on some of the coefficients result from the partial
adjustment model (2):
lnOit = λβ lnPi,t−1 + γ′Xit + (1− λ)γ′ lnXi,t−1 + (1− λ) lnOi,t−1 . (3)
Empirical investigations on the causes of crime suffer from the fact that a
substantial share of crimes is not registered by the police. Furthermore, the
variable might be subject to measurement error. Consequently, the number
of crimes reported to the police in region i during time period t can be
modelled as
O∗it = θ
∗
i δ
∗
tOitν
∗
it , (4)
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where θ∗i is the share of crimes in region i reported to the police, δ
∗
i the
share of crimes during time period t reported to the police (normalized with
regard to the regional effects), Oit the actual number of crimes committed in
region i during time period t, and ν∗it a positive measurement error. Taking
logarithms gives
lnO∗it = lnOit + θi + δt + νit , (5)
where θi, δt and νit denote the logarithms of θ
∗
i , δ
∗
t and ν
∗
it, respectively. Thus,
different shares of crimes are reported to the policy due to regional and/or
time–specific influences on reporting behaviour.
Solving (5) for Oit and inserting in (3) provides the econometric specification
for the observable variables
lnO∗it = λβ lnPi,t−1 + γ
′Xit + (1− λ)γ′ lnXi,t−1 + (1− λ) lnO∗i,t−1
+λθi + δt − (1− λ)δt−1 + νit − (1− λ)νi,t−1 . (6)
Resulting from the theoretical modelling of dynamic adjustment through a
partial adjustment of expected deterrence in combination with a statistical
model of measurement error in crime rates, we obtain a dynamic specification
and the suggestion to test for state and time specific effects which might
result from unobserved heterogeneity, in particular, differing shares of crimes
reported to the police.12 Finally, since no assumption about independent
distribution of the terms in (4) has to be made, the error terms of (6) do
not have to be autocorrelated. Nevertheless, it is indicated to test for this
eventuality.
Including both state– and time–specific effects in the estimated model, i.e. ap-
plying a two–way fixed effects model, we also take into account institutional
changes as, for instance, changes of the federal law, or other unobserved
heterogeneity that applies to all cross–sectional units simultaneously. Statis-
tical inference in applied fixed–effects panel econometrics is often based on
(asymptotic) standard errors of the ordinary least squares estimator with-
out consideration of any potential serial correlation of estimated residuals
which would render standard t–values and F–statistics of only descriptive
12It should be noted, however, that this conclusion requires the assumption of a time
invariant structure of unreported crimes between states. Experience with similar data
(Entorf 1996, Entorf and Spengler 2000) has shown that the inclusion of state effects also
covers the explanatory power of population density.
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use. Also for the reason mentioned above, we inform about potential ser-
ial correlation by calculating a statistic provided by Bhargava, Franzini and
Narendranathan (1982), who modified the classical Durbin–Watson statistic
for the use with panel data, which we call BFN–DW.13
In order to cover the whole spectrum of the potential drugs–crime nexus,
we estimate the model (6) for different crime categories. In particular, we
are interested in the explanatory power of drug offences for murder, rape,
assault, i.e. violent crimes that might be motivated as system–related crimes
or result from pharmacological factors, and for robbery and theft (with and
without aggravating circumstances), i.e. property crimes that are possibly
drug–driven in the sense of economic–related crimes.14
The data for the estimation of model (6) consist of a balanced West German
panel containing annual data for the years 1976 – 1995 from all 10 states
(Laender) that formed the Federal Republic of Germany prior to the Ger-
man unification in 1990 with the sole exception of Berlin. Berlin, which
contained a West and East German part, is removed from our empirical
analysis.15 During the years following the unification there were difficulties
in the registration of crimes and clear–ups in the five new states (Branden-
burg, Mecklenburg–Vorpommern, Saxony, Saxony–Anhalt, Thuringia).16 In
order to rely on relatively long time series, and since drug related crimes
would need a different approach in East Germany, we refrained from includ-
13The DW–statistic might be biased towards two in the presence of a lagged dependent
variable. As there is a strong cross–sectional dimension, this issue is of minor importance
in the case of panel data. Moreover, note that both DW as well as BFN–DW are used as
descriptive statistics indicating problems of misspecification.
14The exact econometric identification of system–related crimes, economic–related
crimes and of pharmacological effects is not subject of this paper. Tackling this aim
would require information on prices of illicit drugs, which however, are not available for
Germany at disaggregate levels over a long period of time. In our paper we try to find
out whether there is any — perhaps confounded — influence stemming from illicit drugs
in economics of crime models.
15In fact, the Land Berlin consisted of former West–Berlin and East–Berlin after 1990.
This property and the fact, that Berlin became the capital of Germany suggests a special
situation for Berlin as pointed out by a referee.
16According to notes provided in our data source (Bundeskriminalamt (1996)) East
German police statistics of the years 1990 to 1992 are biased downwards due to admin-
istrative adjustment problems. Thus, 1993 is the first year after unification which allows
for a reasonable comparison between East and West German crime figures.
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ing data from the five East German states.
Crime and clear–up rates are taken from the German Federal Criminal Police
Office. We use the rate of drug related crimes per inhabitant (DRUGS) for the
German Laender as proxy for the use of illicit drugs. This variable comprises
illegal drug consumption and trade with narcotics, but does not include drug
related crimes, such as theft of drugs from pharmacies or theft in order to
obtain money for drug consumption. Therefore, our proxy variable does
not simply coincide with “economic–related crimes” of drug offenders in the
sense of Goldstein (1985). In most studies, the effect of deterrence variables
(clear–up or conviction rates, length of arrest, fines) are found to be more
or less negative, i.e. in line with predictions from theory (see, for instance,
Eide, 1994, for a survey). In our specification, as in most applications of the
Becker–Ehrlich model, we measure deterrence by clear–up rates. We refrain
from testing deterrence by use of an indicator of the severity of punishment,
because the identification of state–specific law interpretations is difficult to
obtain and is left to future research.
Legal income opportunities are represented by the unemployment rate (UR),
i.e. the probability to find a legal job. The data for this variable is taken
from annual reports of the Federal Employment Service (Bundesanstalt fu¨r
Arbeit). Unemployment rates measure absence of legal income opportunities,
and are integral part of most empirical models of the Becker–Ehrlich type,
although the expected positive sign cannot be observed in many economet-
ric studies (Chiricos 1987, surveying 68 studies, shows that fewer than half
find positive significant effects). Raphael and Winter–Ebmer (2001) argue
that the failure to control for variables that exert pro–cyclical pressure may
downwardly–bias estimates of the unemployment–crime effect. Given our
measure of income, in line with Raphael and Winter–Ebmer (2001), Cook
and Zarkin (1985) and related literature, we are able to adjust for any omit-
ted variable bias of this kind. Furthermore, we use data from the Federal
Statistical Office of Germany (Statistisches Bundesamt) to calculate state
specific real GDP per capita (GDP H) as an additional income measure. The
expected sign of this variable is not evident a priori. Persons who choose
between legal and illegal income opportunities, and who are looking for a
legal job and/or certain reservation wage levels, would be more successful in
prospering regions, suggesting that better legal income opportunities would
lead to a negative sign. On the other hand, states that do better than the
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average provide lucrative targets and attract potential criminals who, more-
over, might leave degrading regions. Such “crime migration” would result in
a crime enhancing effect, i.e. a positive sign.
Demographic factors are strongly correlated with crime, at least in a bivari-
ate framework. For instance, of 100 suspects in 1999, more than 75 are
male, and more than 40 are younger than 25 years. Young men aged 15–24
years are suspected to have committed 27% of all registered crimes, whereas
the population share of this group is only 6% (Bundeskriminalamt, 2000).
These facts have led us to consider the share of young men under 25 years
of age (M15-24) in the crime–supply equation. The data for this and other
demographic factors are all calculated based on data supplied by the Federal
Statistical Office of Germany. Besides gender and age, the share of migrants
(foreign citizens) exhibits a positive correlation with some crime rates. For
example, in 1999, more than 25% of all suspects were migrants, whereas
the population share is about 9% (Bundeskriminalamt, 2000). It should be
noted, however, that there are many reasons why foreigners might be over–
represented in the group of suspects.17 However, in order to avoid potential
omitted–variable biases, we have included the share of migrants in the pop-
ulation (MIGRANT as a further demographic factor in our set of explanatory
variables. It might also serve as a proxy for overall mobility of the population
and ethnic heterogeneity.
As demonstrated in Section 2 of our paper, expenditures on German police
are positively correlated with registered crime, most probably because ad-
ditional financial means could be used by the police to reduce the share of
unreported crimes. Thus, since the dependent variable is registered crime,
available from official police statistics, and not (unobservable) actual crime, it
is important to control for such “crime producing” factors in order to achieve
17First, they may be more often wrongly suspected than the native population. Second,
there are some laws – like the foreigner and asylum laws – which can, by definition, only
be broken by foreigners. Third, migrants residing in Europe are to a higher percentage
young men. Fourth, some migrants may be in European countries after fleeing their
homeland, because they were offenders there. Finally, most migrants enter European
countries, because they had no economic success in their home country. The latter may
be due to factors that foster crime, for example, lack of education. These points should
be kept in mind when judging the coefficients of the migrant variable in our empirical
results (see also Entorf and Larsen (2004) for a detailed description of the link between
immigration and documented crime).
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crime rates adjusted for distortions arising as a consequence of varying gov-
ernment expenditures. It has been argued before how our econometric model
covers some of these aspects by introducing a partial adjustment framework
and allowing for two–way fixed effects. Nevertheless, we also include the po-
lice expenditures per capita (POL H) as an additional control variable. Data
on police expenditures can be found in statistics on public finance (O¨ffentliche
Finanzstatistiken) published by Federal Statistical Office of Germany.
Finally, the description of our data seems to suggest that conservative gov-
ernments are more successful in fighting or preventing crimes. In addition to
correlative evidence presented in Section 2, it might be interesting to note
that in our sample (1976 – 1995) conservative party participation in state
governments is associated with crime rates being 33.7% lower in conserva-
tively governed states and government periods. Of course, there are other
ways of interpretation. For instance, voters of Christian–democrat parties
may be more law–abiding than voters of other parties. Another explanation
may be that conservative parties are more successful in rural or wealthy re-
gions, whereas crime is an urban phenomenon, located in cities with social
problems like unemployment and illicit drug use, rendering bivariate corre-
lation coefficients potentially spurious. To judge suppositions of this kind
would require the consideration of the conservative government effect in a
multivariate context. In our framework, we use a dummy variable CONSERV
indicating whether conservative parties (CDU or CSU) belong to the ruling
coalition of the respective state at time t.
Table 3 provides some descriptive statistics for all the variables used in our
estimations.
4 Estimation results
Panel regression results are summarised in Table 4 and Table 5. The results
in Table 4 are based on the dynamic specification (6) with fixed effects for
the Laender, while the results for two–way fixed effects are reported in Ta-
ble 5. For a discussion of alternative specifications see the discussion of our
sensitivity analysis reported in Section 5 below. The BFN–DW–statistics are
also reported. They do not indicate any remaining serial correlation which
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Table 3: Descriptive statistics of pooled data
Variable Mean Std.Dev.
O1 - O6 = Crime rates calculated as number of crimes
known to the police per 100,000 inhabitants
O1 = Murder and manslaughter 4.94 1.86
O2 = Serious assault 112.01 40.94
O3 = Rape 11.03 4.73
O4 = Robbery 65.45 63.18
O5 = Theft under aggravating circumstances 2885.86 1833.21
O6 = Theft without aggravating circumstances 2047.30 754.62
P1 - P6 = Clear–up rates calculated as ratio of cases
cleared up to cases known to the police
P1 = Murder and manslaughter 94.01 4.18
P2 = Serious assault 84.17 5.05
P3 = Rape 71.30 5.80
P4 = Robbery 49.41 7.50
P5 = Theft under aggravating circumstances 16.36 4.95
P6 = Theft without aggravating circumstances 46.70 5.88
DRUGS = Number of drug offences per 100,000 inhabitants 149.55 116.67
MIGRANT = Percentage of foreign citizens in the population 7.21 2.93
GDP H = Real gross domestic product per capita in prices
from 1991 (in Euro)
19247.55 5197.07
UR = Unemployment rate 7.82 3.16
M15-24 = Percentage of males aged 15–24 in the popula-
tion
7.45 1.06
POL H = Police expenditures (in Euro) per capita in
prices from 1991
108.40 35.50
CONSERV = Dummy variable that takes the value 1 if the
state is ruled by a Christian party (CDU or
CSU), or if a Christian party belongs to the rul-
ing coalition of political parties
0.46 -
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could point at a potential misspecification of the dynamic model.
Table 4: Estimation results, dynamic model, state effects
Independent Para- Theft Theft Robbery Murder Assault Rape
Variables meter u.a.c. w.a.c.
Partial Adjustment λ 0.43∗∗ 0.46∗∗ 0.34∗∗ 0.57∗∗ 0.23∗∗ 0.46∗∗
(0.07) (0.05) (0.05) (0.07) (0.04) (0.07)
log (Pt−1) β -0.30∗∗ -0.33∗ -1.05∗∗ 0.03 1.35∗∗ 0.32
(0.09) (0.14) (0.22) (0.54) (0.62) (0.26)
log (DRUGS) γ1 0.07∗ 0.08∗∗ 0.08∗ 0.03 0.08∗∗ 0.16∗∗
(0.03) (0.02) (0.04) (0.07) (0.03) (0.05)
log (GDP H) γ2 -0.07 -0.37∗∗ 0.06 -0.82∗ 0.06 -1.22∗∗
(0.20) (0.14) (0.26) (0.36) (0.22) (0.29)
log (UR) γ3 0.17∗∗ -0.05 0.07 0.10 -0.00 -0.14∗∗
(0.03) (0.03) (0.04) (0.06) (0.03) (0.04)
log (M15-24) γ4 0.83∗∗ 0.39∗∗ 0.74∗∗ 0.59∗∗ 0.37∗∗ 0.76∗∗
(0.12) (0.09) (0.16) (0.21) (0.14) (0.18)
log (MIGRANT) γ5 0.34∗∗ 0.45∗∗ 1.00∗∗ 0.52∗∗ 0.51∗∗ 0.25
(0.10) (0.07) (0.13) (0.19) (0.10) (0.15)
log (POL H) γ6 0.47∗ 0.24 0.16 0.42 0.44∗ 0.09
(0.20) (0.14) (0.24) (0.40) (0.18) (0.31)
BFN–DW–statistics 1.77 1.97 2.25 2.06 2.14 2.05
Adjusted R–squared 0.986 0.978 0.985 0.790 0.966 0.929
Notes: Standard errors in parantheses, ∗∗, ∗ denote significance at the 1% and 5%
level, respectively; fixed state effects included; sample: West German states without
Berlin, 1976–1996 (200 observations). See equation (6) for the econometric specifica-
tion and the role of parameters therein.
The economics of crime literature presumes variables of deterrence among
the most important third factors. Our estimation results in Table 4 show the
expected negative sign of the clear–up rate for the first three crime categories
covering property crimes. In fact, for these crimes, a significant negative im-
pact of the deterrence variable P is found. The magnitude of the estimated
elasticities for property crimes is in line with results reported in the litera-
ture. For instance, Eide (1994, p. 156) reports a median of −0.34 based on
the evaluation of a sample of several studies. In contrast, for violent crimes,
the coefficient of the deterrence variable is positive and for assault even sig-
nificant. Overall, we might conclude that there is evidence in favour of the
deterrence hypothesis of the economics of crime model for property crimes,
but not for violent crimes.
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The drugs–crime nexus appears significant for all crime categories except
murder. The estimates of the drug impact range between insignificant and
0.19 for rape in the two–way fixed model (see Table 5), while most values are
between 0.06 and 0.10. The estimated parameter on rape appears surpris-
ingly high compared to other crime categories, but is robust across different
specifications. This result might be at least partly explained by the pharma-
cological effect of illegal narcotics, but deserves a closer analysis. Given the
moderate values of the estimated elasticities for the other crime categories,
suppositions about the dominating influence of drug addiction on crime need
to be put in perspective. The inclusion of third factors has shown the spuri-
ous nature of high bivariate correlation coefficients.18
Estimated results are similar to those of Corman and Mocan (2000), who
report significant effects for burglary and robbery, but who did not detect
any significance of drug use on both murder and assault (there was no analysis
for rape). The latter outcome is somewhat surprising for the U.S., given the
high death rate among the members of a drug selling gang reported in Levitt
and Venkatesh (2000).
Higher wealth as mirrored by the variable GDP H exhibits the expected neg-
ative impact on all crime categories where significant. Higher income means
both reduced incentives to commit property crimes and more safety with
regard to violent crimes. Unemployment UR, however, has the ambiguous
result usually found in the literature. Positive (crime enhancing) significant
effects of higher unemployment can be found for theft u.a.c., whereas esti-
mated coefficients are insignificant for other categories and even significantly
negative for rape. The reason for the existence of ambiguous results is often
discussed in the literature, but we suggest to keep in mind that many studies
(like ours) are dealing with regional data. Evidence using information on the
mobility and origin of offenders in the German state Baden-Wu¨rttemberg
(Bu¨ttner and Spengler, 2003) reveals that criminals prefer regions with low
unemployment over regions with high unemployment, a result that also holds
for violent crimes, and that might be explained by the presence of more lu-
crative targets in advantaged regions. Thus, in exactly the same way as GDP
p.c., also unemployment rates can be interpreted in the sense of both legal
18For instance, regressing “log (theft under aggravating circumstances)” (theft u.a.c.)
on “log (drug offences)” using pooled OLS (without any further regressor) would lead to
a highly significant regression coefficient of 0.47 (see Tables 6 and 8).
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and illegal income opportunities, such that also negative signs are plausible
when offender mobility is taken into account.
The effect of demographic variables does not seem to differ substantially
between property and violent crimes. Higher shares of young men are always
linked to significantly higher crime rates, while a higher share of migrants
as a measure of ethnic heterogeneity and mobility has a significant positive
impact for all crime categories except rape.
Contrary to expectations based on simple correlation analysis, police expen-
ditures do show up slightly significantly only for two crime categories. This
lack of significance might be explained by considering a regression of police
expenditures per capita on fixed time and region effects. After adjusting
for serial correlation, the adjusted R–squared of this unreported regression
is 0.994, hence almost all variation can be explained by cross sectional dif-
ferences, aggregate cyclical variation of the Federal budget and by serial
correlation, all of which are controlled for in our specification of considered
crime categories.
Also contrary to the results of a simple correlation analysis, government
participation of conservative parties does not show any significant impact
on (recorded) crime. After controlling for third factors given by demo-
graphic movements, unemployment, income possibilities etc., “conservative
governments” do not perform any better than non–conservative governments.
Therefore, this variable has been omitted from the final specifications.
For Table 5, the estimated model comprises both state and time specific
effects. Possibly due to the high collinearity between some explanatory vari-
ables, their lagged values and time effects, the significance of some estimated
parameters decreases when time effects are included. For example, the strong
evidence on a significant effect of the share of young men (M15-24) disap-
pears for theft under aggravating circumstances and assault. Furthermore,
the estimated effects of deterrence become smaller and several variables loose
significance.
Summing up, property crimes fit the economic model of crime much bet-
ter than violent crimes, a result which is not surprising given that prop-
erty crimes are supposed to be closer to the idea of the “rational” offender,
whereas violent crimes often seem subject to irrational behaviour. The phar-
24
Table 5: Estimation results, dynamic model, two–way fixed effects
Independent Para- Theft Theft Robbery Murder Assault Rape
Variables meter u.a.c. w.a.c.
Partial Adjustment λ 0.44∗∗ 0.39∗∗ 0.31∗∗ 0.60∗∗ 0.22∗∗ 0.44∗∗
(0.07) (0.06) (0.06) (0.07) (0.05) (0.08)
log (Pt−1) β -0.32∗∗ -0.29 -1.15∗∗ 0.26 0.50 0.27
(0.07) (0.20) (0.26) (0.57) (0.74) (0.31)
log (DRUGS) γ1 0.06∗ 0.10∗∗ 0.07 -0.08 0.08∗∗ 0.19∗∗
(0.03) (0.02) (0.04) (0.08) (0.03) (0.06)
log (GDP H) γ2 -0.43 0.04 -0.25 -1.41∗ 0.26 -0.76
(0.26) (0.22) (0.39) (0.60) (0.35) (0.51)
log (UR) γ3 0.18∗ 0.00 0.00 0.10 -0.13 -0.03
(0.08) (0.06) (0.11) (0.17) (0.09) (0.14)
log (M15-24) γ4 0.42 0.77∗∗ 1.27∗ 1.78∗∗ -0.37 1.52∗∗
(0.30) (0.24) (0.54) (0.62) (0.52) (0.54)
log (MIGRANT) γ5 0.27 0.10 0.42 0.34 -0.11 0.11
(0.17) (0.13) (0.27) (0.35) (0.25) (0.32)
log (POL H) γ6 0.03 0.20 0.07 0.04 0.12 0.52
(0.20) (0.15) (0.26) (0.49) (0.22) (0.37)
Significance of time effects Yes Yes Yes No Yes Yes
BFN–DW–statistics 2.14 2.17 2.33 2.05 2.10 2.14
Adjusted R–squared 0.992 0.985 0.989 0.789 0.970 0.936
Notes: Standard errors in parantheses, ∗∗, ∗ denote significance at the 1% and 5%
level, respectively; fixed state and time effects included; sample: West German states
without Berlin, 1976–1996 (200 observations). See equation (6) for the econometric
specification and the role of parameters therein.
macological effect of drugs and the systemic effects related to the climate of
the notoriously violent drug scene seem to be responsible for the high coeffi-
cient on rape. The economics of crime model performs best for theft u.a.c.,
both with respect to fitting the data and to accordance with effects predicted
by theory.
Furthermore, the impact of drugs appears stable and robust. Nevertheless,
omission of drugs does not result in severe signs of misspecification, but imply
somewhat higher parameter estimates for ethnic heterogeneity and a small
positive bias on police expenditures (see our sensitivity analysis below).
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5 Sensitivity analysis and comparison of re-
sults
Some additional estimation results presented in the Appendix reveal the
robustness of our results. They are presented in Tables 7 – 9, where we
first consider the extent of the omitted variable bias stemming from the
neglect of illicit drug use in economics of crime models, we then present the
robustness of drug-use elasticities of crime in response to various econometric
specifications, and finally test the performance of “drug deaths” as alternative
measure of illicit use of narcotics.
We have performed estimations without consideration of the drugs–crime
channel (see Appendix, Table 7). This is interesting for two reasons. First,
we are able to quantify the degree of bias caused by omitting the influence of
drugs in econometric models of crime. Second, there might be some simul-
taneity bias stemming from endogenous drug use, when illicit use of narcotics
arises as a consequence of crime, for instance when within growing criminal
milieus drug abuse belongs to the everyday pattern of criminal social inter-
action. However, results reveal that omitting drugs from the model has only
a minor impact on the estimation of other effects. Comparing Table 7 to
Table 4, we observe that the main difference lies in somewhat larger para-
meter estimates for both MIGRANT and POL H. As an important consequence
though, the influence of ethnic heterogeneity would be erroneously significant
for rape when drug offences were omitted. Since high shares of foreigners, po-
lice expenditures and drug offences all are phenomena of urban and densely
populated areas, these variables are highly correlated in a regional setting
like ours, but not necessarily in any causal way. Leaving out one of these
variables bears the danger that the other variables spuriously cover the effect
of the neglected factor, which is a property of the classical omitted variable
bias that seems to take place here, albeit in a moderate way.
Estimates of drug–use elasticities have shown parameter estimates ranging
between 0.03 and 0.16 in Table 4 and -0.08 (which is the insignificant para-
meter estimate on murder) and 0.19 (for rape) in Table 5, with the medians
being 0.08 (Table 4) and 0.075 (Table 5), respectively. Results appear rather
stable within a small range except for the rape equation, which produces
the maximal estimated drug elasticity. Table 6 summarizes results from Ta-
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bles 4 and 5 and from further estimates listed in the appendix (Table 8) and
puts them into perspective. Table 8 considers unconditional estimates, i.e.
log–log specifications with log(DRUGS) as sole explanatory variable, but with
different kinds of control for unobserved heterogeneity. Here, three different
specifications are tested for each crime category: a) pooled OLS, b) two–way
fixed effects (state and year effects), c) two–way fixed effects plus correction
for serial correlation of residuals (which are treated as autoregressive process
of order one). Looking at the pooled OLS estimate, it becomes obvious that
the absence of any other control variable would produce spuriously high es-
timates. For instance, theft u.a.c. and robbery would be highly sensitive
to illicit drug use with estimated elasticities being 0.47 and even 0.69, re-
spectively (see also the first row in Table 6). Estimated parameters change
substantially when state and time effects are included in order to cover time
series and cross–sectional variance, estimates in equations for murder and
rape even change their sign (Table 8, and second row in Table 6). However,
applying the BFN–DW residual diagnostic test for identification of general
model misspecification in the time series dimension,19 there are severe signs of
misspecification also after including state and time effects (BFN–DW ranges
between 0.34 for robbery and 0.94 for murder, i.e. both deviate significantly
from two). In order to alleviate bias from misspecification, each category is
re–estimated under consideration of autoregressive state–specific residuals,
i.e. each regression is based on two–way fixed effects and additionally cor-
rected for serial correlation such that BFN–DW no longer indicates problems
of misspecification. Inspecting Table 6 (3rd row), we observe that these re-
sults from a pure time–series approach almost coincide with those of our full
(dynamic) models in Table 4 and 5 (Table 6, rows 4 and 5), and we con-
firm rape being an outlier from an otherwise rather homogenous set of drug
elasticities.
When we compare our results to estimates reported by Corman and Mocan
(2000) (henceforth CM), it should be noted that we use a different measure
of illicit drug use (we use drug offences and not deaths due to drug poison-
ing; see Section 2 for an explanation of the failure with regional data sets,
and attempts at applying drug deaths below), different econometric methods
19The Durbin–Watson statistic is designed to detect errors that follow a first–order
autoregressive process. As is well known from the applied econometrics literature, this
statistic also fills an important role as a general test of model misspecification. See, for
example, the discussion in Gujarati (1995, pp. 462–464).
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Table 6: Summary of drug–use elasticities of different types of crime depen-
dent on model specification
Theft Theft Robbery Murder Assault Rape
Specification u.a.c. w.a.c.
DRUGS only, pooled OLS 0.47 0.23 0.69 0.16 0.30 0.12
(0.05) (0.03) (0.04) (0.03) (0.02) (0.04)
DRUGS only, two–way fixed effects 0.18 0.13 0.42 -0.02 0.16 -0.11
(0.02) (0.01) (0.03) (0.03) (0.02) (0.03)
DRUGS only, two–way fixed effects 0.08 0.08 0.09 0.03 0.08 0.19
correction for serial correlation (0.03) (0.02) (0.04) (0.06) (0.03) (0.06)
Full model: state effects (Table 4) 0.07 0.08 0.08 0.03 0.08 0.16
(0.03) (0.02) (0.04) (0.07) (0.03) (0.05)
Full model: state and time effects 0.06 0.10 0.07 -0.08 0.08 0.19
(Table 5) (0.03) (0.02) (0.04) (0.08) (0.03) (0.06)
Notes: See Tables 4, 5 and 8 for estimation details; standard errors in parantheses
(panel econometrics versus time series analysis) and different observational
units (German states versus New York City). In spite of these differences,
there are similarities between our results and those presented by Corman and
Mocan (2000). With respect to violent crimes, in both articles no significant
relationship is found between drug-use and murder (rape is not considered by
CM). In both articles, property crimes were found to be affected by illicit use
of narcotics. As far as coinciding property crime categories are considered
(CM estimate robbery, burglary and motor-vehicle theft), estimated drug–
use elasticities of robbery are higher in New York than in Germany (0.18
to 0.28 versus 0.07 to 0.08). Different results are found for assault, which
is insignificant in New York, but significant (0.08) in Germany. Hence, CM
can draw the conclusion that combating drug–use is less important for vio-
lent crimes which is not readily supported by German evidence, in particular
when the rather clear and stable effect on rape is taken into consideration.
To put these German and US results into perspective, it is interesting to
compare them with alcohol consumption elasticities found for Sweden. Ed-
berg (2004) provides evidence for both violent and property crimes. In her
preferred (so called ‘baseline’) specifications she found an insignificant elas-
ticity for aggregate property crime where she estimated alcohol elasticity
to be 0.09, and a significant alcohol elasticity of aggregate violent crime of
about 0.28. In her category–specific estimation, the largest alcohol consump-
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tion effect is reported for rape, although the very high parameter estimate
of 0.730 (which is the highest among all reported categories) is insignificant
(and significant only at the 18%-level, respectively). Contrary to CM, she
found significant results for murder and assault. By way of summing up this
international evidence on pharmacological and systemic effects, we observe
that most addiction/intoxication related elasticities of crime range between
0.05 and 0.30, and that no clear distinction can be made between violent and
property crime.
The variable “drug offences” is replaced by the “number of deaths due to drug
poisoning” in Table 9 (see Appendix). The sample, too, has changed since
the latter variable has only been available since 1984 at the disaggregate
level. Drug deaths, the indicator of drug problems used by Corman and
Mocan (2000), works in neither case for our kind of regional data: estimated
drug-use elasticities range between 0.00 and 0.08 and remain insignificant in
all specifications. One might suspect this outcome to be an artefact of the
different sample period, but repeating regressions of Table 9 using “log (drug
offences)” instead of “log (drug deaths)” results in coefficients which are
almost the same as for the longer time period in the corresponding Table 4,
as can be seen from the coefficients for theft u.a.c.: 0.09 (Table 4: 0.07),
theft w.a.c.: 0.10 (Table 4: 0.08), robbery: 0.11 (Table 4: 0.08), murder:
n.s. (Table 4: n.s.), assault: 0.08 (Table 4: 0.08) and rape: 0.23 (Table 4:
0.16) (estimates not listed elsewhere). Similar results are obtained when we
re–estimate Table 9 using both state and time effects and compare resulting
estimates to those of the corresponding Table 5 (results not reported). Thus,
we may conclude that the variable “drug offences” instead of “drug deaths” is
more responsive to the drugs–crime channel in econometric models of crime
based on disaggregate regional data.
6 Conclusions and discussion
Drug addiction is a topic of major public concern. This is partially due
to the assumption that there might exist a causal relationship between drug
abuse and increasing crime rates. In fact, a cursory inspection of the problem
might lead to this conclusion. Many surveys indicate that drug users are more
likely to have a connection with the criminal justice system (through arrests
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and incarcerations) compared to non–drug users, and criminal justice system
data indicates that a large percentage of arrestees test positive for illicit drug
use at the time of their arrest (see French et al., 2000, for a survey of the
related criminological literature). However, drug use may be, as French et al.
(2000) put it, the “catalyst” for criminal activity, but the interrelationships
between drug use and crime are more complex and require more than a
two–dimensional view of the drugs–crime nexus. In this paper, this link is
analysed within the Becker–Ehrlich model of crime supply, augmented by
the consideration of currently discussed factors such as unemployment and
demographic changes.
Estimation with panel data for West German states allows us to assess the
importance of the drug abuse crime link, which comprises systemic, economic
and pharmacological effects. According to our estimation results, which ap-
pear to be quite robust with regard to different specifications, a significant
drugs–crime nexus appears to be relevant for several crime categories. This
link has been ignored in most previous applications of the Becker–Ehrlich
framework. Our analysis of the variable MIGRANT (i.e. the share of foreign
citizens in the German resident population) demonstrates the potential im-
portance of the resulting omitted variable bias. Nevertheless, illicit drug use
is far from being the only or exclusive driving force behind the evolvement of
crime rates. For example, the median of estimated deterrence elasticities of
property crimes is -0.33, whereas drug–use elasticities of property crimes are
relatively small (but significant) and range between 0.06 and 0.10 with a me-
dian of 0.08. Thus, the rational–choice hypothesis is confirmed for property
crimes.
Significant effects found on property crimes such as robbery and theft can be
attributed to a significant economic crime effect of drug abuse in Germany.
The lack of significance of the drug measure for murder and assault might be
taken as weak evidence against a pronounced systemic effect of the market
of illicit drugs on these crime categories, although it has to be taken into
account that the overall statistical performance of the economics of violent
crime model is less convincing than the evidence in favour of the economics of
property crimes. Pharmacological and systemic effects might be the driving
force behind the relatively high and surprisingly robust estimate for the drug–
use elasticity of rape.20
20Results of the effect of illicit drug use on rape are rarely found in the criminological
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In spite of a different approach to the drug problem (different drug mea-
surement, methods and observational units), our results are similar to those
presented by Corman and Mocan (2000), underlining the robustness of the
results found. We are sceptical, however, with respect to the far–reaching
policy implications made by Corman and Mocan (2000). Based on the com-
parison of estimated elasticities of robberies, for instance, which are, 0.18 to
0.28 for drug use and -0.71 to -0.94 for robbery arrests, they conclude that
“increased law enforcement is a more effective methods of crime prevention
in comparison to efforts targeted at drug use”. Without consideration of any
cost–benefit analysis, such suggestions are difficult to justify. They would
require cost estimates of a one percent change in drug offences and arrests
or clear–up rates on the one hand, and estimation of benefits in terms of
reduced costs of crime, more particularly of murder, assault, theft, robbery,
vandalism etc. on the other. Corman and Mocan (2000) do not use such
figures, although costs of crime are available for the U.S. (see, for instance,
Anderson 1999; unfortunately, no comparable cost of crime estimates can
be obtained for Germany). Furthermore, insights from the literature on the
economic costs–of–illness need to be included in a comparative evaluation of
the costs and benefits of combating illicit drug use. According to a survey
by Cartwright (2000), in one of the latest cost–of–illness estimates for drug
abuse in the U.S. (Harwood et al. 1998), the aggregate burden was 98 billion
dollars in 1992, of which 59% was attributed to the related costs of crimi-
nal behaviours. Thus, there is only fragmentary evidence that needs to be
integrated into a homogenous picture in future work.
Chronic drug users are also victims of crime. This is a neglected aspect when
quantifying the benefits of crime reduction. French et al. (2000) find that,
relative to non–drug users, chronic drug users are 16 percent more likely
to become a victim of crime, 23 percent more likely to be a perpetrator of
crime, and 25 percent more likely to be either a victim or a perpetrator. The
latter aspect might also be relevant for the strong impact of drug use on rape
indicated by our estimates.
literature. Entorf and Spengler (2002, p. 159, p. 201) report a strong crime–enhancing
effect of drug offences for rape and theft using 2946 panel observations from 440 counties
(“Kreise”). Edberg (2004) has shown that violent crimes in general might be significantly
affected by alcohol consumption, hence intoxication and addiction are confirmed as impor-
tant factors. Corman and Mocan (2000) do not include the crime category rape in their
analysis.
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The most difficult task, however, remains the evaluation of the benefits of
drug prevention programs or rehabilitation programs. There is a variety of
programs in use, and not all of them seem to be ineffective. A substan-
tial body of research in the US, mainly performed by the Department of
Health, has found that treatment programs can produce marked reductions
in illegal drug use and drug–related crime. For instance, the United States’
1996 National Treatment Improvement Evaluation Study found that clients
reported a decrease of about 50% in the year following treatment and that
arrests had declined from 48.2% to 17.2% (NACRO 1999). Of course, there
are good reasons to be sceptical of such great successes, and econometricians
might suspect some selectivity problems. However, it is for precisely this
reason that much more evaluative work needs to be done before far–reaching
conclusions like the one given by Corman and Mocan (2000) can be drawn.
Given the lack of unambiguous cost–benefit results, besides conventional
measures which try to increase the clear–up rate, programs aiming at re-
ducing economic–related and pharmacologically induced crimes as a conse-
quence of drug abuse remain important tools of public policy. However, in
order to obtain sustainable effects, such programs should not contribute to
an increase in rents on the illegal drug market, but rather aim at reducing
these rents. The development of actual proposals to this end remains very
much on our research agenda.
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A Appendix: Results of Sensitivity Analysis
Table 7: Sensitivity analysis, omission of illicit drugs (dynamic model, state
effects)
Independent Para- Theft Theft Robbery Murder Assault Rape
Variables meter u.a.c. w.a.c.
Partial Adjustment λ 0.41∗∗ 0.46∗∗ 0.34∗∗ 0.57∗∗ 0.27∗∗ 0.52∗∗
(0.06) (0.05) (0.05) (0.07) (0.05) (0.08)
log (P) β -0.29∗∗ -0.24 -1.12∗∗ 0.03 1.21∗ 0.19
(0.09) (0.14) (0.22) (0.54) (0.56) (0.24)
log (DRUGS) γ1 – – – – – –
log (GDP H) γ2 0.04 -0.23 0.20 -0.76∗ 0.18 -0.92∗∗
(0.20) (0.14) (0.26) (0.34) (0.21) (0.26)
log (UR) γ3 0.18∗∗ -0.04 0.07 0.10 0.00 -0.12∗∗
(0.03) (0.03) (0.04) (0.06) (0.03) (0.04)
log (M15-24) γ4 0.82∗∗ 0.40∗∗ 0.72∗∗ 0.59∗∗ 0.33∗ 0.75∗∗
(0.13) (0.10) (0.17) (0.21) (0.14) (0.17)
log (MIGRANT) γ5 0.38∗∗ 0.50∗∗ 1.04∗∗ 0.53∗∗ 0.54∗∗ 0.37∗∗
(0.08) (0.07) (0.13) (0.18) (0.10) (0.15)
log (POL H) γ6 0.54∗∗ 0.29∗ 0.20 0.45 0.49∗∗ 0.12
(0.21) (0.15) (0.24) (0.40) (0.19) (0.31)
BFN–DW–statistics 1.78 1.97 2.22 2.06 2.12 2.00
Adjusted R–squared 0.986 0.977 0.984 0.790 0.965 0.926
Notes: Standard errors in parantheses, ∗∗, ∗ denote significance at the 1% and 5%
level, respectively; fixed state effects included; sample: West German states without
Berlin, 1976–1996 (200 observations)
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Table 8: Sensitivity analysis of estimated drug elasticities
Explanatory factors Theft u.a.c. Theft w.a.c. Robbery
log(DRUGS) 0.47 0.18 0.08 0.23 0.13 0.08 0.69 0.42 0.09
(0.05) (0.02) (0.03) (0.03) (0.01) (0.02) (0.04) (0.03) (0.04)
Two–way fixed effects no yes yes no yes yes no yes yes
Correction for serial
correlation of residuals no no yes no no yes no no yes
BFN–DW–statistics 0.06 0.36 2.29 0.05 0.67 2.15 0.10 0.34 2.37
Adjusted R–squared 0.324 0.966 0.991 0.234 0.972 0.985 0.561 0.936 0.987
Murder Assault Rape
log(DRUGS) 0.16 -0.02 0.03 0.30 0.16 0.08 0.12 -0.11 0.19
(0.03) (0.03) (0.06) (0.02) (0.02) (0.03) (0.04) (0.03) (0.06)
Two–way fixed effects no yes yes no yes yes no yes yes
Correction for serial
correlation of residuals no no yes no no yes no no yes
BFN–DW–statistics 0.35 0.94 2.24 0.08 0.37 2.14 0.10 0.80 2.51
Adjusted R–squared 0.122 0.694 0.784 0.393 0.887 0.967 0.042 0.866 0.926
Notes: Standard errors in parantheses; sample: West German states without Berlin,
1976–1996 (200 observations)
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Table 9: Sensitivity analysis, use of “drug deaths” (dynamic model, state
effects)
Independent Para- Theft Theft Robbery Murder Assault Rape
Variables meter u.a.c. w.a.c.
Partial Adjustment λ 0.51∗∗ 0.63∗∗ 0.40∗∗ 0.63∗∗ 0.53∗∗ 0.52∗∗
(0.11) (0.05) (0.07) (0.10) (0.08) (0.10)
log (P) β -0.31∗ 0.05 -0.28 0.09 1.40∗∗ 0.55
(0.03) (0.18) (0.35) (0.64) (0.46) (0.37)
log (DEATHS) γ1 0.03 0.02 0.02 0.08 0.00 0.01
(0.02) (0.01) (0.02) (0.05) (0.02) (0.03)
log (GDP H) γ2 -0.97∗ -0.11 -0.03 -1.29 0.11 -0.67
(0.42) (0.23) (0.44) (0.74) (0.27) (0.60)
log (UR) γ3 -0.05 -0.02 -0.13 0.10 -0.03 -0.07
(0.09) (0.06) (0.10) (0.17) (0.06) (0.14)
log (M15-24) γ4 0.76∗ 0.80∗∗ 0.50 0.20 0.10 1.26∗∗
(0.32) (0.17) (0.33) (0.53) (0.20) (0.41)
log (MIGRANT) γ5 0.42∗ 0.64∗∗ 1.06∗∗ 0.11 0.39∗∗ 0.57∗
(0.20) (0.11) (0.20) (0.34) (0.13) (0.27)
log (POL H) γ6 0.79∗∗ 0.70∗∗ 0.63∗ 0.22 0.45∗ 1.24∗∗
(0.30) (0.17) (0.31) (0.57) (0.21) (0.44)
BFN–DW–statistics 1.56 1.87 2.25 1.88 2.24 2.18
Adjusted R–squared 0.985 0.982 0.989 0.834 0.972 0.933
Notes: Standard errors in parantheses, ∗∗, ∗ denote significance at the 1% and 5%
level, respectively; fixed state effects included; sample: West German states without
Berlin, 1983–1996 (130 observations)
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